For the first time in recent history, at least two of the five Central Asian republics (CARs) have been directly drawn into a conflict in the southern Asian region. In the past, the Soviet Union zealously shielded this region from outside influence or involvement. Thus, even during the Soviet Afghan  war, the Central Asian Republics were largely screened from the conflict. But not so this time. The United States has for the first time succeeded in drawing out the former CARs with the tacit approval of Moscow and placed them as frontline states in the battle against terrorism and the Taliban. By doing so, the US has made the former republics more susceptible to future events and developments in the southern Asian region. The US has also made a permanent investment in Central Asia and will therefore remain permanently involved in the region. Analyst K.R. Jawahar looks at these developments and concludes that the events of October and November 2001 will have profound long term effects in the region.

The unfortunate events of 11 September 2001 compelled  the United States to return to Afghanistan after more than a decade. For most of the 1980s, the US had been deeply involved in Afghanistan, helping the Afghan Mujahideen fight the Soviets. The US turned its back on Afghanistan once the last Soviet soldier left. Now it was back - this time to fight the Taliban and destroy Osama bin Laden's Al Qaida terrorist outfit. The latest Afghan war entailed the physical presence of the American military in a region that was not considered altogether friendly to the US. The US military required air bases bordering Afghanistan from which to launch air operations as well as to provide logistics support to allied combatants within Afghanistan. Pakistan readily offered three air bases but this was obviously not enough. For, the nature of the Afghanistan terrain is such that all the major routes generally go around Afghanistan's central mountain system. From Pakistan, which borders eastern Afghanistan, natural routes through the mountains lead to Kandahar in the south east and Jalalabad and Kabul in the east. the northern towns of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Taloqan are difficult to approach from the east. The only route that cuts across the eastern segment of the mountain is the Kandahar-Ghazni-Kabul-Salang Pass-Mazar-e-Sharif road. However, the Salang tunnel which burrows nearly 2 kms through the mountains before meeting the road to Kabul plains is badly damaged and blocked by wreckage from the Soviet war. Mazar-e-Sharif is better connected by road to the Uzbek city of Termez. Herat likewise, is better connected to Turkmenistan and the cities of Kunduz and Taloqan are best approached from Tajikistan.

The geography of Afghanistan suggested that jump off points and air bases in the central Asian republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would be vastly useful in America's war against the Taliban. As it turned out, Uzbekistan emerged as a second key ally in the region after Pakistan and readily offered a major former Soviet military base to the US in return for a security guarantee. US bombers refuelled in Uzbekistan while a contingent of about 2,000 Marines and an unknown number of helicopters were based there. This garrison provided crucial support to the Northern Alliance in its battles in northern Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Taloqan. Uzbekistan turned out to be a more secure place for Americans than Pakistan, where US military aircraft came under hostile fire from unknown elements and where the local intelligence agency, the ISI, was proved to be not altogether trustworthy. The US need an alternative to Pakistan for several other reasons. For one, Pakistani demands in return for its cooperation to the US were rising. From economic assistance involving writing off debts and increased American aid to a definite say in the post-Taliban political dispensation, Pakistan was asking for everything. The US was also aware of the close linkages between sections of the ISI, the Pakistani Army and the Taliban. As retired Rear Adm. Stephen Baker of the US observed, "the lowest risk to the forces is in Central Asia. When you look at the unrest in Pakistan, the amount of support and security you'd need, especially for jets, is horrendous''.

Co-operating with the US

The CAR's, even after a decade of independence, are still living in the shadows of their former master, Russia, which is seen both as a protector and exploiter by these states. When it comes to regional stability and inter-state conflicts, Russia acts like a protector. However, most CARs are poor and their principal source of income is through commodity sales. Traditionally, the only outlet for commodity exports, even oil and gas, has been through Russia. Most of the oil pipelines from the CAR's go through Russia, which allows it to dictate terms to the CAR's. Russian buyers not only pay poorly but are also extremely tardy with their payments. Russian companies are estimated to owe millions of dollars to the CARs. The result of all this is an urge to find alternative markets and shrug off their bear grip.

Most of the CAR's are also caught in the violence of domestic Islamist movements which have links with the Taliban and the Al Qaida. Uzbekistan, for instance, has been battling the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant organisation that carried out terrorist attacks during 1999 and 2000. The IMU and its sister organisations, like Tajikistan's United Tajik Opposition, seek to establish Islamist regimes in all the CARs. The Taliban and several Pakistani Jihadi organisations are known to support the IMU. Virtually every central Asian leader has proven to be autocratic and oppressive. Political opposition has traditionally not been permitted, resulting in the imprisonment of thousands of central Asians. The cycle of Islamic insurrection and violent crackdowns by the CAR states have been growing. Western governments have generally been unsympathetic to the central Asian regimes, which are viewed as corrupt and oppressive. Russia has generally been helpful in the fight against the Islamist forces but it has always demanded a high price for its military support. Moreover, in recent times, the overstretched and under-financed Russian army has not been able to provide full assurance to the CARs.

Alliance with the United States, the world's super power makes eminent sense for most of the central Asian states. Uzbekistan, which agreed to hand over the Khanabad a military base to the US, was rewarded by a security arrangement that makes it mandatory for the US to protect the unity and integrity of Uzbekistan from internal and external forces. President Bush identified the IMU as having links with the Al Qaida and announced the intention of the coalition to turn the heat on them after the Afghan campaign. Tajikistan similarly faces violence from the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and believes that the Taliban is behind domestic extremism. An alliance with the US will give the CAR's diplomatic immunity and the consequent freedom to be more brutal with the Opposition. The promise of economic returns is an equally compelling motive for supporting the US. Turkmenistan, for instance, wants to exploit the south asian market for oil and gas but only if the US succeeds in building the trans Afghan pipeline. The CAR's also realise that an alliance with the US is a guarantee for funds from western investment companies and multilateral institutions. The ascendance of the US in central Asia is resented by Russia but Russian know that they cannot invest as heavily or decisively in the region as can the US and its European allies. Central is thus destined to be the setting for an era of competition between the US and Russia. But for once there are little chances of this competition degenerating into conflict, as can be seen with the case of Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan and the US

Uzbekistan took the lead in providing support to the US military campaign. Initially, due to Russian influence, Uzbekistan refused to let its territory be used for staging any military operation in Afghanistan. After his 19 September 2001 meeting with the Russian National Security Council Secretary General, Vladimir Rushailo, the Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated that, "we have not given any commitment to allow the use of our territory and airspace". The shift in Uzbekistan's position came after the meeting between President Karimov and the Defence Secretary of the US, Donald Rumsfeld on 4 October 2001. After the meeting, Karimov stated that, "the US has been allowed to use Uzbek airfields and other facilities for aircraft, helicopters and the stationing of personnel for search and rescue missions linked to an eventual military operation in Afghanistan". To a question as to why Uzbekistan would not allow special forces to operate from its territory, Karimov stated that, "we are not quite ready for this". He added that, "we have no secret deal, no covert negotiations with the US". However, it was clear to all observers of events in Central Asia that Karimov was just bargaining with the Americans and looking back over his shoulders to see how the Russians might be reacting. Finally, on 12 October 2001, the US went on to sign a landmark security agreement with Uzbekistan, under which the US would provide military forces to defend the unity and integrity of Uzbekistan against all internal and external threats. President Karimov also sought American help to counter the IMU and influence Tajikistan to close down the military camps of the IMU which are located in its territory.
 

Both Uzbekistan and the US have been engaged in military cooperation since 1998 when President Karimov had expressed an interest in having US troops stationed in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan and the US had signed a treaty in early 2001 for the elimination of Soviet era chemical and biological weapons facilities. Another aspect of continuing cooperation between the US and Uzbekistan is that the 5th Group of the US Army Special Forces provides training to Uzbek military for border security and peacekeeping operations. After Karimov expressed his willingness to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, the US began conducting military exercises in the region and also provided military equipment such as communication radios to the Uzbek military.

On 1 October 2001, President Karimov had chaired a meeting of Uzbekistan's top security officials to decide the nature of Uzbek support to the US military campaign. He stated after the meeting that, "Uzbekistan supports the decisiveness of the US and all peace loving nations to finish this evil and plague of the 21st century". He agreed to open his country's airspace to the US and provide bases for military operations against possible targets in Afghanistan. The probable bases for the US campaign were Chirchik, Tuzel, Kagayty, Kakaidi and  Khanabad. Chirchik, located just 466 miles from the Afghan capital of Kabul, was earlier used for NATO operations and it was reported that some helicopters were still stationed there. Tuzel is located on the outskirts of Tashkent and its nearness to the capital provides connectivity and it could be used for supply services. It is also capable of handling military transport planes. The 2 US C-130H military transport planes carrying reconnaissance equipment to be installed along the Uzbek-Afghan border landed here on 20 September 2001.  Kagayty air base is located just 20 kms north of Termez which is very near to the Afghan town of Mazar-i-Sharif. Its significance is that it can handle all types of aircraft. Termez has a bridge built across the river Amu Darya which could facilitate the transport of military equipment and troops into Afghanistan. Similarly, the Kakaidi air base is located in southern Uzbekistan near Afghanistan and could provide strategic advantage to the campaign. Khanabad air base is located 300 kms south of Tashkent and 200 kms north of the Uzbek-Afghan border. Defence experts were of the view that the US decided on Khanabad as the staging ground for its Afghan operations because of its extensive facilities. Khanabad, a Soviet era airbase located near Karshi in southern Uzbekistan, was provided to the US to stage its military operations. Media reports suggested that Paul Bargani, British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, had convinced Karimov to provide Uzbek bases for the military campaign. Following President Karimov's decision, nearly 2,000 US troops from the 10th Mountain Division were stationed at the Khanabad air base. Long range US bombers such as the B2 and B-52 H which were earlier flying from Diego Garcia, Germany or the US could now stop at Khanabad after carrying out their missions in Afghanistan, refuel and return safely. This allowed flexibility in spreading air strikes across Afghanistan.

Gains for Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is a Sunni Muslim country with nearly 90 per cent of its 22.8 million population belonging to the Islamic faith. President Karimov has ruled with a strong hand to maintain secularism in the country. In doing so, he has jailed thousands of radical muslims. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant islamist organisations that has support from the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, operates in Uzbekistan. Its objective is to establish an Islamic regime and  it carries out terrorist attacks on Uzbek soil. It is a member of Osama Bin Laden's International Islamic Front. It has been added to the US State Department's list of terrorist organizations. The security guarantee with the US will enable Uzbekistan to counter the IMU. Also the dismantling of the Taliban regime and the Al Qaida network will cut external support for the IMU. Moreover, Uzbekistan is also hopeful that the US will pressurise Tajikistan to come down heavily on the IMU camps within its territory. The returns are evident as the US President Bush singled out the IMU as an ally of the Taliban. President Bush stated that, "the evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as Al Qaida. This group and its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan". In return for Uzbekistan's support, the US will provide assistance to Uzbekistan to contain the IMU.

Economically too, Uzbekistan stands to gain. The new relation with the US could help Uzbekistan access western funds and aid. Ever since the 1996 suspension of free convertibility of the Uzbek national currency, the Soum, the country's debt burden and inflation have been growing.  Karimov's reluctance to go ahead with market reforms have led to a poor business climate that have clouded the prospects for economic growth. In return for its cooperation, Uzbekistan could expect increased financial assistance to boost its reforms programme and economic growth. Uzbekistan could also be looking at northern Afghanistan, which is the most prosperous region of that country, for resources and markets. Northern Afghanistan has a substantial Uzbek population led by the Uzbek and US supported warlord General Rashid Dostum.

President Karimov has been able to gain significant benefits for Uzbekistan by supporting the US military campaign. Uzbekistan now seeks to emerge as the dominant state in the central asian region. Even though Russia influence on this state is clearly on the decline,  it is striking a balance in its relations with both the US and Russia. Uzbekistan is less worried about the internal Islamist threat. Moreover, a stable Afghanistan will bring a mad rush of 'oil seekers' into the region. Uzbekistan could benefit from investments by international companies and institutions. It has nearly 70 tcf (trillion cubic feet) of gas reserves which could be exported. However, Uzbekistan's expanding ambitions could heighten tensions with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These countries as well as Uzbekistan lay claim to areas of the Ferghana valley, a fertile agricultural region riven with inter ethnic conflict. Uzbekistan could use its new found stature of an US ally to occupy these disputed lands. Ironically, this is one reason why others, particularly Tajikistan, are equally keen on alliances with the United States.

Tajikistan

Tajikistan, which shares a 1,340 km long border with north western Afghanistan, was the other CAR that came out openly on the side of the US in its military campaign in Afghanistan. Immediately after the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US, Tajikistan expressed its willingness to join the coalition against terrorism. On 21 September 2001, President Emomali Rakhmonov, at the opening of the country's Democratic Party Congress in Dushanbe, stated: "Tajikistan is ready to cooperate with the international community, including the American government, in the struggle against terrorism and international extremism." However, at that time, he did not mention the possibility of offering Tajik territory for the US military campaign. Not only does Tajikistan have the longest border with Afghanistan amongst all the CARs but it also has links with the substantial Tajik community within Afghanistan. It supports the Tajik faction led by former Afghan President, Burnahuddin Rabbani. Tajiks are estaimted to constitute 25 per cent of the Afghan population.

Tajikistan's state religion is Islam and nearly 85 per cent of its 6.5 million population are Shia muslims and another 5 per cent Sunni Muslims. President Rakhmonov has ruled with an iron hand since 1994, maintaining a degree of order in the country. Any perception of the US campaign as one against Islam could lead to popular resentment within the country. Tajikistan is the nerve centre of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant Islamist organisation that seeks to topple the exisiting regimes in the region. The IMU is based in the mountainous regions of Tajikistan, which gives it a strategic advantage in striking the Ferghana Valley that is located within the countries of  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. After the IMU attacks of October 2000, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstgan and Tajikistan signed the Collective Security Treaty (CST). This treaty allowed the deployment of Russian troops in its member countries. Uzbekistan chose not to join this treaty fearing increased Russian interference in its affairs. Tajikistan government agreed to a UN brokered peace agreement with the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a coalition of nationalists and Islamist movements within Tajikistan. However, violence still continues as the UTO refuses to accept the peace settlements criteria's such as de-weaponisation of its guerrillas. The Taliban regime is suspected of providing all kinds of support to these militant Islamist movements. A major apprehension for Tajikistan was that its support to the US campaign might result in increased violence by the IMU which is close to the Taliban regime.

The question of Russian approval of Tajikistan's support to the US campaign was another apprehension for Tajikistan. Tajikistan's security is dependent on Russian troops. Under the collective security treaty, nearly 20,000 Russian forces belonging to the 201st Motorized Rifle Division guard the Tajik-Afghan border as well as provide security in other parts of Tajikistan. Russia also provides economic assistance to Tajikistan. Hence, any act of support to the US has to be approved by Moscow. After his 3 November meeting with US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, Russian President Putin encouraged the central asian states including Tajikistan to support the US campaign.

Towards Co-operation

On 2 October 2001 Tajik President Rakhmonov spoke to the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, and reassured him of full cooperation of Tajikistan in the US struggle against terrorism and extremism. He also reminded Powell that three years ago it was Tajikistan which had raised the idea of creating a 'security belt' around Afghanistan at the United Nations. Talks on military assistance began with the visit of Gen. Tommy Franks, the Commander of the US army's Central Command on 31 October 2001. His visit focussed on identifying the probable bases in Tajikistan from where the US could conduct or support its military operations. During his visit, Gen. Franks also met the commander of the Tajik faction of the Northern Alliance, Gen. Mohammad Fahim. The objective of Gen. Franks visit was to lay the  groundwork for the specifics of future Tajik-US cooperation. Tajikistan at this time already provided overflight privileges for the US planes as well as some intelligence on conditions inside Afghanistan. Thereafter, US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, met President Rakhmonov on 3 November 2001 and discussed the specifics of Tajik-US cooperation in the war. Though no significant decisions were made, Rumsfeld, said that, "this visit is valuable to all of us. The President intimately knows Afghanistan, the dynamics on the ground and the difficulties of the task". A significant outcome of the Rumsfeld visit was that it was decided that a U.S. Central Command assessment team will visit Tajikistan to examine three military installations as possible bases for U.S. troops and equipment for the Afghan operations. After the visit of the team on 5 November 2001, Pentagon spokesman, Rear Admiral John Stufflebeem stated that, "the US military teams checked airfields in Tajikistan to see if they could serve as bases and help increase the intensity of raids by American warplanes". Three specific bases namely Kulyab, Khujand and Kurgan-Tyube were assessed by the US military team. But nothing was reported thereafter.

The Strategic Advantages for the US

Tajikistan borders north eastern Afghanistan and has several air bases near the border, which were set up by the former Soviet Union. The Tajik bases located in the town of Kulyab and Parkhar are just 60 miles from the Afghan border. These bases are used by the Northern Alliance forces to fly supplies from Tajikistan to their forward positions in Afghanistan. The Kurgan-Tyube base is located in the southern part of Tajikistan and overlooks the Afghan town of Kunduz. The Kulyab base which is 50 miles southeast of Dushanbe, is a large airfield capable of handling all types of aircraft. It is north of the Afghan town of Taloqan and the northeastern province of Takhar. The former Soviet Union had expanded this base to support its Afghanistan invasion of 1979. The US is using aircrafts such as the B-52 bomber, C-130 Hercules, C-5 Galaxy which is one of the biggest aircraft in the world and the C-17 Globemaster, a version of the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. These aircrafts are huge and need special airstrips to land and take off. The Kulyab base is capable of accommodating all these heavy aircrafts and would enhance the strike and supply capabilities for the US military campaign. The third base under consideration, Khujand, is located in north Tajikistan. The US could use this base for stationing its supplies and manpower. The use of Tajik bases would save mid-air refueling of fighter and transport aircrafts and also reduce the time to carry a flight mission into and out of Afghanistan. In addition, Tajikistan has allowed the stationing of French fighter planes in its military bases for air strikes on the Taliban.

For Tajikistan, the returns in the long term are significant. Tajikistan, till now dependent on Russia and Uzbekistan for military and economic aid can begin to look at  new sources offered by the US and its allies. For one, Tajikistan does not have an oil refinery to treat its crude oil reserves and has to import all petroleum products. In September 2000, an Austrian firm had agreed to back Tajikistan plans to build an oil refinery with a $3.5 million line of credit. However, the project stalled because of lack of finances. The US has money and influence with international financial institutions and could support this refinery project. But whether or not the US chooses to help out Tajikistan will depend on how serious the US is about its long term committments to the region.

Turkmenistan

The US military strategists also focussed on Turkmenistan, which shares a 744 km long border with Afghanistan, as one of the probable US bases in the region for the military campaign against Afghanistan. Its southwestern town of Kalai Mor is just opposite to the Afghan town of Herat and the southeastern town of Kerki is near Mazar-i-Sharif and is also connected by rail link to Ashgabat. A Turkmenistan based strategy would allow the US to dominate a broad area in Afghanistan from Herat to Mazar-i-Sharif and Kholm in the northeast. However, Turkmenistan refused participation or support of any kind to the US military campaign. In a statement released on 19 September 2001, the Foreign Ministry brushed aside any such scenario, stating that it will run counter to the neutral status of Turkmenistan.

However, Turkmenistan later offered its support and facilities to any humanitarian mission undertaken by the US. Unlike other states of the region, it refused to give any support to the US military campaign. Since its independence in 1991, Turkmenistan has followed a policy of 'positive neutrality' in its relations with its neighbours. Turkmenistan is the only neighbour of Afghanistan that has kept its relations with the Taliban regime as well as other parties in Afghanistan. Its relations with other states such as Iran, Pakistan and Russia are also stable. No other state in the region has been able to maintain a degree of consistency  in their relations with Afghanistan.

Hesitation Before Co-operation
Turkmenistan has been facing the threat of militant Islamist groups suspected to be linked with the Taliban. For the last two years, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant group based in Afghanistan, has undertaken acts of violence in Turkmenistan and other countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. The IMU is the main militant Islamist organisation in the Central Asian region. The initial hesitation of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov to give any support to the US was because he wanted to avoid any confrontation with the Taliban. In 1995, Turkmenistan and the Taliban regime had signed an agreement under which the Taliban affirmed that they would refrain from any subversive action against its northwest neighbour. Niyazov took this decision to sign the non confrontation agreement as Turkmenistan did not have the resources required to maintain a large military. Niyazov stated that, "Turkmenistan is governed by its own oriental laws according to which it will not assist the US in a war against the Taliban".

The reluctance of Turkmenistan to assist the US has roots in the history of US policy towards Turkmenistan. In February 2000, the US had issued a statement criticising the policy of mass amnesty given by the Turkmen President. The US objection was that the amnesty did not include many prominent dissidents like Nurberdi Nurmamedov, co-chairman of the opposition movement Agzybirlik. Nurmamedov was arrested for criticising the parliamentary elections and the extension of Niyazov's presidential term. The then Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, did not go to Turkmenistan during her April 2000 visit to the Central Asian region.
Turkmenistan is also one of the few states in the region that has managed to break its dependence on Russia and follow an independent course in its foreign policy. Turkmenistan has withdrawn from the Russian-promoted bilateral security treaty and does not participate in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It has also withdrawn from the CIS visa regime. Despite being prodded by Russian President Putin, Turkmenistan did not provide military assistance to the US. Turkmen representatives did, however, participate in a counter terrorism conference held in the US two months later.

The Limited Co-operation Decision
The first instance of direct talks on co-operation between Turkmenistan and the US came when Eric Schultz, US charged'affaires, met President Niyazov on 14 September 2001 to brief him on the proposed retaliatory plans of the US. On 24 September 2001, President Niyazov stated that American humanitarian missions to Afghanistan will be allowed through Turkmenistan. He reached this agreement after a telephonic conversation with the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Niyazov told the Secretary that, "Turkmenistan follows a policy of neutrality and for that reason no armed forces of another state will enter its territory and its air space will not be opened for warplanes on military missions". Therefore, it was decided that all humanitarian efforts of the US like the dropping of food packets etc. will be allowed through Turkmenistan.  Following this decision, the UN sponsored World Food Programme (WFP) started supplying relief materials to refugee camps that were set up in Turkmenistan.

However, a report by The Guardian stated that 2 US C-130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying surveillance equipment to be installed along the northern Afghan border landed in Uzbekistan on 20 September 2001. It stated that the aircrafts could not fly over Iran but Turkmenistan which borders Afghanistan granted overflight permission. The paper quoted US diplomats, saying that the Turkmen were less keen to grant overflight rights to the US fighter aircraft heading for the Afghan border. On the same day, the US, citing security reasons, withdrew the 99 American Peace Corps volunteers from Turkmenistan.

Louis Michel, the foreign minister of Belgium, which is holding the presidency of the European Union, met Turkmen President Niyazov on 1 November 2001. He explained EU's support to 'new friends' of the West in the war against terrorism. But Niyazov conveyed his scepticism of the way humanitarian aid to Afghanistan was being provided at present, and called for a unified policy to be drawn up on aid. He said that, "there is the issue of providing humanitarian aid. All efforts made by the UN to coordinate this have proved unsuccessful so far. At the same time, many states are boasting that they are giving humanitarian aid, but nobody knows who is providing this aid and where and how they are doing it. All this seems rather like propaganda". Niyazov, however, continued to permit the disbursement of humanitarian aid through his country.

Turkmen Stakes In Afghanistan

Turkmenistan sits on considerable reserves of natural gas and it seeks to export this gas. Turkmenistan has around 101 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves. Gas production jumped to 1.66 billion cubic feet in 2000 from 788 million the year before. In 2000, oil and gas accounted for 63% of the $2.4 billion exports by Turkmenistan. International energy companies like the Exxon Mobil Corp., the U.K.'s Burren Energy, Dragon Oil of the United Arab Emirates, Austria's Pado Oil and Chemical, and Malaysia's Petronas Carigali etc. are currently involved in Turkmen oil and gas exploration and production. There are only two pipelines that take Turkmen gas out of the country. One pipeline runs through Kazakhstan to Russia and the other goes to Northern Iran. In the absence of a pipeline system to South Asia, Turkmenistan is forced to sell much of its gas to cash starved central asian states that often default on their payments. Turkmenistan views Pakistan, Afghanistan and India as potential markets for its gas. Turkmenistan has made several attempts to realise a pipeline to south asia. One of them was the proposed gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan which was shelved after the US company UNOCAL withdrew from the project in 1997. At the regional level, Turkmenistan has sought to engage its neighbours towards constructing a pipeline system. The Ashgabat Declaration of May 1997 brought the countries of the region together for the development of the transport and communication infrastructure and the networking of transnational pipelines in the Economic Cooperation Organisation Region (ECO). Several pipeline routes were discussed by the members of the ECO. Turkmenistan's emphasis was on two routes that would enable it to export its gas. The first was the Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey-Europe pipeline. Here, the Turkmen gas going to Europe will have to compete with Iranian, Russian, Kazakh and Azerbaijani supplies. The second was the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline system which is the most beneficial route for Turkmenistan. However, the Afghan conflict has stopped any movement in this direction. Turkmenistan's plans of increasing its gas exports to Iran in view of the Iran-India pipeline coming to fruition is also held up. In addition to the above routes, Turkmenistan had proposed a new gas pipeline starting from Turkmenistan to East Asia via Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well as from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan through Caspian Sea and to Turkey. Both these pipelines systems would be very expensive to construct and pass through hostile territory. The most beneficial route for Turkmen gas exports is through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. Turkmen hopes rests on the multi-national Central Asian Gas Consortium (CENTGAS) that was created in 1997 to build this trans Afghan pipeline. Chary Annaberdyev, Turkmenistan's minister consul in the USA stated that, "for Turkmenistan, any pipeline that allows it to sell its gas is welcome". Turkmenistan would clearly benefit from a pipeline system passing through Afghanistan that is not threatened either by internal fighting or a war. The centrality of Afghanistan to Turkmen gas exports is one of the main reasons why it has maintained good relations with the Taliban regime, and stood steadfast against Russian or American influence.

Conclusion

The Afghan war is a good example of the famous dictum that, 'war is diplomacy through other means'. The war served as an opportunity for both the CARs and the US to open a new era of bilateral relations. Alliance with the West gave the CARs significant economic and political openings. Cooperation from the CARs strengthened the 'northern strategy' of the US military campaign in Afghanistan and facilitated the realisation of war objectives. Two months into the war, the Al Qaida network is dented significantly; the Taliban have been overthrown and a broad based interim administration established; and, the main objective of bringing Osama bin Laden to justice is within reach. The Afghan war has also impacted upon the geopolitical order of the central asian region in a significant way. With the diminished presence of Russia and the alliance between the US and the CARs, the region is going to witness a new geopolitical order. By engaging the CARs, the US seeks to exploit the oil and gas reserves in the region and also check the stranglehold of the Gulf countries on world oil prices. A common strand that runs through this emergent relationship between the US and the Central Asian states is that the Afghan war has given a big window to decisively change the geopolitical formulation of the region.

Author: K.R. Jawahar
Date: 26 November 2001